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DUE PROCESS OVERBREADTH? THE VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS DOCTRINE, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, 
AND THE BREWING STORM OVER UNDEFINED 
CONSENT IN SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTES 
DONALD A. DRIPPS
*
 
Three seemingly unrelated legal developments are on a collision course. 
The first is the trend toward defining criminal sexual assault by the absence 
of the victim’s consent rather than by the defendant’s use of force.
1
 This 
doctrinal trend reflects the widely shared moral judgment that the essential 
wrongness underlying rape is the violation of the victim’s sexual 
autonomy.
2
 
The second development is the Supreme Court’s recognition of a 
constitutional right to private sexual relations between consenting adults.
3
 
As with the move toward defining sex crimes by the absence of consent,
4
 
this move toward invalidating sex offenses when consent is present reflects 
the perceived special value of sexual autonomy. Here, however, the 
widespread moral judgment is that sexual intimacy with consent has special 
value that sets it apart from and ahead of other interpersonal relationships, 
whether those of business or of platonic friendships. The reform of sexual 
assault laws reflects the value of negative freedom about sex, while the 
constitutional right of sexual privacy reflects the value of positive freedom 
about sex.
5
 
The third development is the Supreme Court’s robust application of the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine (“VFVD”).
6
 The Court has applied the VFVD 
for more than a century. The opinions, however, apply the doctrine 
                                                                                                             
 * Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego Law School. This Article 
benefited greatly from comments received at the conference and from colleagues Kevin Cole 
and Larry Alexander. I am grateful to Liz Parker and Sasha Nunez for outstanding editorial 
assistance. 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013) (“Private, consensual 
sexual intimacy between two adult persons of the same sex may not be punished by the 
State, and it can form ‘but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.’”) (quoting 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)); see also infra Part II.  
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See infra Part II.  
 6. See infra Part III. 
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sometimes in a minimal form and, sometimes, in a sweeping form that 
resembles the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
7
 In minimal form, the 
VFVD permits striking down a statute as void only when the statute has no 
constitutionally permitted applications.
8
 Logically, this view of facial 
challenges entails a strict standing requirement, i.e., individuals may 
challenge a law under the VFVD only if they face actual injury and only if 
they assert their own rights rather than the rights of third parties.  
Some cases, however, take a broader view of the VFVD. Under this 
view, a vague statute is void even when it has a clear core of forbidden 
conduct.
9
 If the statute’s penumbra is wide and indefinite, so as to invite not 
just unfair surprise but arbitrary enforcement as well, the Court may 
invalidate the statute completely (thus the “void” in the VFVD). This 
version of the VFVD resembles the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. 
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine permits an individual 
prosecuted for expression not protected by the First Amendment to 
challenge the facial constitutionality of a statute on the ground that the 
statute might inhibit others from engaging in constitutionally protected 
speech.
10
 The Court has repeatedly said that the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” available only to combat the 
disease of self-censorship.
11
 Yet, if there is any such thing as the void for 
vagueness doctrine applicable to criminal statutes that restrict conduct as 
distinct from speech, the VFVD functions as a sort of overbreadth doctrine. 
If a statute has any constitutionally permissible application, then facial 
invalidation, rather than simply cutting off the unconstitutional excesses, 
amounts to a due-process overbreadth doctrine that protects not the 
expressive, but the behavioral, autonomy of third parties. 
  
                                                                                                             
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part III.  
 11. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (“Application of the 
overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine.”); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008) (quoting L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting 
Pub’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999)). 
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A criminal statute that punishes sex without “consent” relies on that 
uncertain term to delineate the border between conduct that is punished by 
years in prison and registered sex offender status from conduct that the 
Court has come very close to characterizing as a fundamental right. Few 
jurisdictions have yet defined a criminal offense in terms of sexual contact 
absent “consent” without some more specific hallmarks of just what counts 
as consent. Perhaps future courts will be content to continue using “as 
applied” to label losing claims of vagueness and “facial challenge” to label 
successful claims. But a storm is brewing and it may not blow over. This 
Article describes each of these developments, and closes with some 
thoughts on how to mediate the challenges presented by their looming 
collision. 
I. Increasing Respect for (Negative) Sexual Autonomy: 
Consent-Based Criminal Statutes 
Into the twentieth century, Anglo-American law defined rape as sexual 
penetration, by force, and without consent.
12
 Peculiar, defense-favorable 
rules of evidence, together with a global exception for marital rape, 
accompanied this basic definition.
13
 The American Law Institute’s (ALI) 
Model Penal Code (MPC), hugely influential and justly celebrated, inspired 
little change.
14
 The MPC was, in this instance, more a restatement of 
existing law than a blueprint for reform.
15
  
                                                                                                             
 12. See, e.g., 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(a)(1)-(2) (West 2020) (stating 
that “[a] person commits a felony of the first degree when the person engages in sexual 
intercourse with a complainant” through “forcible compulsion”); see also Iowa v. Keturokis, 
276 N.W. 600, 602–03 (Iowa 1937) (providing the then-existing state statutes on rape 
describing force as a component of the crime); Dawkins v. Alabama, 58 Ala. 376, 378 
(1877) (“A distinct offense, though punished with like severity, was the carnal knowledge 
and abuse of a female child under the age of ten years. Force, overcoming the resistance of 
the woman, if she was not an idiot, or subdued by fraud, or rendered unconscious by the 
administration of drugs, medicines, intoxicating drinks, or other substances, was an 
indispensable element of the offense of rape.”).  
 13. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 18 (1998) (“To guard against 
false accusations, courts imposed strict rules of proof that were unique to rape cases.”).  
 14. The Model Penal Code defines rape as a male having sexual intercourse with a 
female not his wife when:  
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, 
serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on 
anyone; or 
(b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her 
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Genuine reform began with the abolition of the resistance requirement. 
With resistance no longer required, the difficult issues that divide informed 
opinion began to emerge. Is the gist of the crime the use of violence or the 
violation of autonomy? Is the violation of autonomy itself a kind of 
violence? Does the defendant need to be at fault with respect to the absence 
of consent? And, if the gravamen of the crime is violation of autonomy, 
what pressures other than force are consistent with autonomy and so not 
criminal?  
Wherever one stands on the normative issues, the criminal law has been 
moving in the direction of punishing nonconsensual sex, though more 
seriously when the defendant uses what would traditionally be seen as 
force, but still seriously when that kind of force is absent. As I wrote more 
than ten years ago: “Despite occasional reaffirmations of a robust force 
requirement, the trend toward basing liability entirely, or at least primarily, 
on the absence of consent appears to be strong.”
16
 More recent scholarship 
confirms this tide is still coming in: 
We have seen criminal concepts of “force” in some definitions 
of rape evolve to include nonphysical “intellectual, moral, 
emotional, or psychological force,” and even to mean merely the 
force “inherent” in accomplishing sexual penetration and nothing 
more. Indeed, many states have shed the traditional force 
requirement so that rape is now sometimes defined as 
penetration without consent. With force becoming less important 
                                                                                                             
conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge drugs, 
intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or 
(c) the female is unconscious; or 
(d) the female is less than 10 years old. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).  
 15. The MPC also describes a lesser felony of “gross sexual imposition” as “sexual 
intercourse with a female not his wife” when “he compels her to submit by any threat that 
would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution[.]” Id. § 213.1(2)(a). The 
Commentary makes clear that this section applies only to use of force less heinous than that 
enumerated in § 213.1(a). See id. § 213.1 explanatory note (“Section 213.1(2) defines the 
lesser offense of gross sexual imposition, encompassing as a third degree felony several 
categories of conduct that were punished as rape at common law.”).  
 16. Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the 
Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 969 (2008) (footnote omitted).  
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in ideas of sexual violence, more legal focus came to be placed 
on whether the sexual encounter lacked consent.
17
 
A substantial minority of states no longer require proof of force for felony 
sexual-assault offenses.
18
 To those states we can add the federal 
jurisdiction, where the criminal code provides that whoever “knowingly 
engages in sexual contact with another person without that other person’s 
permission shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than two 
years, or both.”
19
 
The most thoroughly considered proposal for a consent-based regime is 
the draft revision of the Model Penal Code.
20
 While the ALI Council 
rejected a revised draft in the spring of 2016,
21
 if the ALI ever approves a 
consent-based MPC provision, it would likely accelerate the trend toward 
making unforced but nonconsensual sex a crime. But that trend began 
before the ALI project and there is no reason to believe that the defeat of 
the proposed draft signals skepticism about focusing on consent. It signals, 
rather, that the devil’s in the details about how consent is to be defined.  
My claim here is a descriptive one about positive law in the United 
States. I take no position here on why autonomy is valuable,
22
 or whether 
laws against sexual assault promote, or ought to promote, values other than 
autonomy.
23
  
                                                                                                             
 17. Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 889 
(2016) (footnotes omitted). 
 18. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) statutory commentary 37 n.87 (AM. LAW INST., 
Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015) (stating that “15 states [have] no statutory force requirement” 
and that “[t]hree states have eliminated force requirements through judicial interpretation 
(New Jersey, Florida and Virginia)”) (citations omitted). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2018). 
 20. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) statutory commentary (Discussion Draft No. 2). 
 21. See Bradford Richardson, American Law Institute Rejects Affirmative Consent 
Standard in Defining Sexual Assault, WASH. TIMES (May 17, 2016), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2016/may/17/american-law-institute-rejects-affirmative-consent/. 
 22. See, e.g., Jonathan Witmer-Rich, It’s Good to Be Autonomous: Prospective Consent, 
Retrospective Consent, and the Foundation of Consent in the Criminal Law, 5 CRIM. L. & 
PHIL. 377, 379–84 (2011) (reviewing Mill’s self-interest theory, Feinberg’s personal 
sovereignty theory, and Raz’s well-being theory).  
 23. See, e.g., JOHN GARDNER, The Wrongness of Rape, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 1, 
15 (2007) (“That a rapist objectifies his victim by treating her as a mere repository of use-
value is what is basically wrong with rape.”). See generally Russell Christopher, 
Unconditional Coercion and Positive Autonomy, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 159 (2020); Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431 (2016) (defending an equality-
based understanding of rape law); Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the 
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II. Increasing Respect for (Positive) Sexual Autonomy: Lawrence v. Texas 
Lawrence v. Texas famously struck down the Texas same-sex sodomy 
statute as a violation of substantive due process.
24
 As the Lawrence 
majority saw the case, it  
involve[d] two adults who, with full and mutual consent from 
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a 
homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for 
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives 
them the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government. “It is a promise of the 
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the 
government may not enter.” The Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.
25
 
Neither in this passage nor elsewhere did the Lawrence majority describe 
the right to sex in private among consenting adults as a “fundamental right” 
subject to abridgment only by policies narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling state interest.  
The key sentence, however, is exquisitely evasive. The Court does not 
say that Texas has no legitimate interest at all. It says that Texas has no 
legitimate interest that can justify its intrusion.
26
 This equivocal stance 
gives little insight and might mean that the state has a great interest, but not 
great enough; or a substantial interest, but not substantial enough; or no 
interest at all, so that the statute flunks even the rational basis test.  
The Supreme Court has the luxury of leaving issues for another day. The 
lower courts cannot send litigants away by denying certiorari. 
Understandably, they have given Lawrence somewhat different 
interpretations. Some lower federal courts have characterized Lawrence 
                                                                                                             
Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013) (arguing that “self-possession,” rather 
than consent, should be the basis of rape law).  
 24. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).  
 25. Id. at 578 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)) (emphasis added).  
 26. Id.  
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solely as an exercise in minimal rational basis review.
27
 Other federal courts 
have characterized Lawrence as recognizing a stronger substantive due 
process right subject to a more searching review.
28
 Academic commentary 
recognized the malleable character of the Lawrence opinion, pointing to a 
variety of plausible readings.
29
  
The more recent landmark decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, held that 
excluding same-sex couples from the long-recognized fundamental right to 
marry violated both due process and equal protection.
30
 As Nan Hunter said 
of Lawrence, Obergefell is “easy to read, but difficult to pin down.”
31
 
Obergefell’s focus on marriage suggests that it neither adds nor subtracts 
from whatever right to unmarried consensual sex was recognized in 
Lawrence.  
                                                                                                             
 27. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 
817 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to 
interpret it to announce a new fundamental right.”); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 
1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e decline to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a 
right to sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny. To do so would be to impose a fundamental-
rights interpretation on a decision that rested on rational-basis grounds . . . .”).  
 28. See, e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d. 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We 
cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did in Lawrence with the minimal protections 
afforded by traditional rational basis review.”); id. at 821–22 (remanding for application of 
“an intermediate level of scrutiny under substantive due process” to the statute at issue); 
Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Lawrence is, in our view, another in this 
line of Supreme Court authority that identifies a protected liberty interest and then applies a 
standard of review that lies between strict scrutiny and rational basis.”); Reliable 
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 n.32 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Lawrence did not 
categorize the right to sexual privacy as a fundamental right, and we do not purport to do so 
here. Instead, we simply follow the precise instructions from Lawrence and hold that the 
statute violates the right to sexual privacy, however it is otherwise described.”).  
 29. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1149 
(2004) (“Lawrence is not broadly libertarian. It is probably not even broadly liberty-
affirming in matters sexual, though that is a closer call. The state can probably continue to 
prohibit prostitution and adult incest, for example, even when these acts result from the fully 
consensual choices of adults.”); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1103, 1113–23 (2004) (discussing the many interpretations one could make based on the 
Court’s decision in Lawrence); Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” that Dare not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1917 (2004) 
(“[T]he strictness of the Court’s standard in Lawrence, however articulated, could hardly 
have been more obvious.”). 
 30. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).  
 31. See Hunter, supra note 29, at 1103.  
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When a school teacher in Texas challenged her conviction for sex with a 
high school student who was above the state’s age of consent, the Texas 
Court of Appeals curtly rebuffed the defendant’s claim to a fundamental 
right to engage in consensual sex in private.
32
 Echoing prior Texas 
decisions, the court characterized Lawrence as recognizing consensual sex 
as “a non-fundamental right using language that applied a rational-basis 
review.”
33
 Obergefell, the Texas court said, didn’t add anything to the right 
recognized in Lawrence because, while the Obergefell opinion “discussed 
marriage as a fundament right,” it “referred to consensual sex, not as a 
fundamental right, but as an ‘intimate association.’”
34
 The Supreme Court 
of the United States issued that most inscrutable of rulings, a denial of 
certiorari.
35
 
The Texas courts’ characterization of Lawrence, however, runs into the 
formidable argument that the holding in Lawrence cannot be squared with 
rational basis review under such cases as Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma.
36
 Williamson rejected a substantive due process challenge to a 
state statute that required a prescription from an ophthalmologist or 
optometrist before an optician could fit old lenses into new frames or 
replace broken lenses.
37
 The Court rejected the constitutional challenge to 
this piece of obvious rent-seeking by the medical profession.
38
 “The day is 
gone,” said Justice Douglas in Williamson, “when this Court uses the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, 
regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be 
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought.”
39
  
The law might be “needless” and “wasteful,” and not “in every respect 
logically consistent with its aims,” but it was nonetheless “enough that there 
is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the 
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”
40
 Justices 
who brought that standard of review to the Texas sodomy statute could not 
                                                                                                             
 32. Ramirez v. Texas, 557 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Tex. App. 2018). 
 33. Id. at 721 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).  
 34. Id. at 720 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600).  
 35. Ramirez v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 799 (2019) (denying cert).  
 36. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  
 37. Id. at 488, 490–91. 
 38. See id. at 490–91. 
 39. Id. at 488.  
 40. Id. at 487–88.  
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have struck it down. The Lawrence Court’s expansive, if evasive, 
references to “liberty”
41
 make quite clear that the majority did not think the 
issue was some statute “regulatory of business and industrial 
conditions[.]”
42
 
To say that Lawrence left review of laws intruding on private consensual 
sex in the same category as laws regulating eyeglass repairs may not be 
demonstrably incorrect. However, the nothing-to-see-here characterization 
seems at odds with both the holding in Lawrence and with the intense 
controversy attending that landmark. Justice Scalia, for example, read the 
majority opinion as far more momentous than a technical application of the 
rational basis test.
43
 
III. Recent Developments: The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine  
Broadly, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine [“VFVD”] requires that a 
penal statute [first] define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness 
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited” and, 
second, describe the offense “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.”
44
 The recent cases generally treat 
constraining official discretion as more important than fair notice.
45
 
The VFVD is well-established, but the Supreme Court has taken two 
quite different approaches in cases decided under it. The classical model, 
based on Marbury v. Madison,
46
 calls upon the federal courts to follow the 
Constitution when it conflicts with lesser laws such as penal statutes. When 
a penal statute covers conduct protected by the Constitution, as well as 
conduct not protected by the Constitution, the Court’s typical response is to 
                                                                                                             
 41. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 565, 567, 574 (2003).  
 42. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488.  
 43. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority “laid 
waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence”). 
 44. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)). 
 45. See id. at 357–58 (“Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens 
and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of 
vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the 
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’”) 
(quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574).  
 46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
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reverse individual convictions based on constitutionally protected conduct, 
but to leave the statute in force with respect to other cases.
47
 
For example, in McBoyle v. United States, the defendant appealed his 
conviction for transporting an airplane across state lines.
48
 The statute 
enumerated trucks, automobiles, and motorcycles, but also included a 
residual clause applicable to “any other self-propelled vehicle not designed 
for running on rails.”
49
 Justice Holmes wrote for the Court that:  
When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the 
common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the 
statute should not be extended to aircraft simply because it may 
seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation 
that if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words 
would have been used.
50
  
The McBoyle Court refused to apply the statute at issue to the instant fact, 
but left the statute in force on facts where it clearly applied. Prosecutions 
for transporting automobiles in interstate commerce continued apace.
51
 
McBoyle thus presented a garden-variety issue about the construction of 
a criminal statute. What if, however, a state court approved judicial 
enlargement of a statute? The state courts are the final arbiters of state law, 
but, as the Court held in Bouie v. City of Columbia, due process forbids 
unfair surprise.
52
 In Bouie, black sit-in protesters were convicted of criminal 
trespass for remaining in a segregated diner after receiving notice to leave.
53
 
The Supreme Court held that the convictions violated due process because 
the statute punished only entry without permission, not the defendants’ 
                                                                                                             
 47. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (refusing to enforce 
convictions based on a new state-court interpretation of the statute after the individuals were 
arrested); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (refusing to apply the statute 
beyond its explicit language). 
 48. McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 25.  
 49. Id. at 26 (quoting the language of the statute). 
 50. Id. at 27 (citing United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209 (1923)).  
 51. See, e.g., Lawrence v. United States, 56 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1932) (affirming 
conviction for violation of the statute).  
 52. 378 U.S. 347, 362 (1964).  
 53. Id. at 348–49.  
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conduct—refusing to leave.
54
 Even after this case, however, the statute 
remained in force.
55
 
In cases like McBoyle and Bouie, defendants assert their own right to be 
free from conviction, absent ex ante statutory condemnation, and the Court 
protects their rights by reversing their individual convictions (on statutory 
grounds in a federal case, and on due process grounds in a state case). In the 
First Amendment context, the Court permits a wider class of persons to 
seek the complete nullification of statutes regulating free expression. For 
example, in Lovell v. City of Griffin, a city ordinance made it a crime to 
distribute “literature” without first obtaining a permit.
56
 The Court held the 
ordinance “void on its face” so that “it was not necessary for appellant to 
seek a permit under it.”
57
 The overbreadth doctrine has both a standing and 
a remedial component, and total invalidation is possible even at the behest 
of litigants whose conduct was not constitutionally protected.
58
 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. at 355, 363 (finding defendants’ conduct “‘not enumerated in the statute’ at the 
time of their conduct”).  
 55. Id. at 362 (“While such a construction is of course valid for the future, it may not be 
applied retroactively, any more than a legislative enactment may be, to impose criminal 
penalties for conduct committed at a time when it was not fairly stated to be criminal.”).  
 56. 303 U.S. 444, 447 (1938).  
 57. Id. at 452.  
 58. See, e.g., Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 
845 (1970). According to the article,  
[T]he doctrine focuses directly on the need for precision in drafting to avoid 
conflict with first amendment rights. It may condemn a statute which 
comprehends a range of applications against privileged activity even though the 
interests it promotes outweigh the infringement of first amendment 
liberties. Furthermore, the Court has been willing to review the breadth of 
statutory burdens on expressive activity even in the case of a person whose 
conduct could constitutionally be burdened.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). Scholars have since produced a large body of literature challenging 
the characterization of overbreadth as reflecting free-speech exceptionalism. See, e.g., 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 
920 (2011) (“[F]acial challenges constitute the norm, not the anomaly, in constitutional 
litigation before the Supreme Court in which the validity of statutes and their applications is 
at issue.”); David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2005) 
(“[W]ithout naming it as such, the Court regularly employs this strategic device in a wide 
range of cases across many constitutional doctrines.”); Toni M. Massaro, Chilling Rights, 88 
U. COLO. L. REV. 33, 39 (2017) (“[F]acial challenges of laws that are substantially overbroad 
and may chill constitutionally protected conduct all should receive the same ‘how soon’ and 
‘by whom’ treatment that overbroad laws receive in free speech cases. The free speech 
overbreadth exception should become the general overbreadth rule.”); Henry Paul 
 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
132 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:121 
 
 
The overbreadth cases, however, insist that third-party standing to seek 
facial invalidation is “strong medicine” limited to First Amendment 
challenges.
59
 The Court’s resolution of due process-based challenges to 
vague criminal statutes, however, bears some resemblance to First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine. The Court has viewed vague laws that 
might impinge upon First Amendment rights as especially suspect.
60
 The 
structure of the VFVD, however, resembles overbreadth analysis even 
when free expression is not at risk. 
For example, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the challenged 
ordinance provided: 
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about 
begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling or 
                                                                                                             
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4 (“The litigant’s right to insist on the 
application of a constitutionally valid rule translates into a requirement of congruence 
between the boundaries of the statute and the Constitution. This congruence requirement is 
of central importance not only in the First Amendment context but wherever any standard of 
review other than the rational basis test is mandated by the applicable substantive 
constitutional law.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Valid Rule Due Process Challenges: Bond v. 
United States and Erie’s Constitutional Source, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 1021 (2013) 
(“Valid rule due process challenges are more common than we think. They are not always 
explicitly articulated, but recognizing that an individual’s basic complaint is government 
compulsion without legal authorization allows us to identify such challenges.”).  
 59. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The Court stated: 
[F]acial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of 
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the 
otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 
“pure speech” toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls 
within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state 
interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally 
unprotected conduct. 
Id. at 615. 
 60. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 94 (1960) (footnote omitted): 
Given these elements—a delegation of power to make particular judgments of 
value in the application of social coercion to private activity which may lie 
within the shelter of some specific constitutional guarantee—the ultimate 
response of the Court will depend upon the nature of the individual freedom 
menaced, the probability of its violation, the potential deterrent effect of the 
risks of irregularity and violation upon its exercise, and the practical power of 
the Court itself to supervise the scheme’s administration. It is evident that the 
first amendment freedoms receive most solicitous protection from today’s 
Court. 
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unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night 
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen 
property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of 
gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons 
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any 
lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, 
persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending 
their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or 
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons 
able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their 
wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon 
conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided 
for Class D offenses.
61
 
Some sections of the ordinance are extremely open-ended, such as 
“strolling around . . . without any lawful purpose.”
62
 Yet so long as actors 
read the ordinance as defining the prohibited persons by their conduct, 
some parts of it are not vague. A statute that punished “picking pockets” or 
“juggling in public” would be quite definite. If the Court had followed the 
McBoyle-Bouie model, it would have examined each defendant’s 
conviction for constitutionality and reversed the unconstitutional ones, 
leaving the statute in place. Certainly, some of the Papachristou defendants 
were indeed convicted under the purported authority of the ordinance’s 
global terms. Papachristou herself was charged with vagrancy for “prowling 
by auto,”
63
 which isn’t even enumerated in the ordinance and could only 
have been covered by “wandering . . . without any lawful purpose.”
64
 
The Court, however, went beyond reversing the convictions before it. 
Justice Douglas wrote for the Court that “[t]his ordinance is void for 
vagueness, both in the sense that it ‘fails to give a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the 
statute,’ and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and 
convictions.”
65
 The specific reference to “arrests” makes plain the 
implication of declaring the ordinance “void.” The ordinance is a nullity 
                                                                                                             
 61. 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1 (1972) (quoting the city ordinance at issue).  
 62. Id. (quoting the city ordinance at issue). 
 63. Id. at 158.  
 64. Id. at 156 n.1.  
 65. Id. at 162 (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 
612, 617 (1954)) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 
U.S. 242 (1937)).  
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and so cannot justify future arrests, even if those arrested are not charged or 
are acquitted. 
Ten years after Papachristou, however, the Court turned back to the 
classical model. In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Flipside, a head 
shop, brought a pre-enforcement challenge to an ordinance which required 
businesses to obtain a license before selling merchandise “designed or 
marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs.”
66
 Justice Marshall’s 
opinion for the Court first rejected Flipside’s First Amendment overbreadth 
argument because the ordinance did not abridge significant free speech 
rights.
67
  
With the First Amendment taken off the table, the Court then applied the 
Bouie template: “A law that does not reach constitutionally protected 
conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be 
challenged on its face as unduly vague, in violation of due process. To 
succeed, however, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications.”
68
 The ordinance, as clarified 
by regulations, clearly applied at least to “roach clips,” which Flipside 
offered for sale.
69
 The facial challenge therefore failed.
70
 
The Flipside analysis might have produced a different result in 
Papachristou. There may, perhaps, be a First Amendment right to juggle, 
but surely there is no such right to pick pockets or commit other types of 
theft. Indeed, the broader the statute, the less likely it is to have no clear 
applications. The tension between Flipside and Papachristou became clear 
in subsequent cases. 
In Kolender v. Lawson, Lawson brought a declaratory judgment action 
seeking facial invalidation of a California statute that provided a criminal 
penalty for anyone  
[w]ho loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify 
himself and to account for his presence when requested by any 
                                                                                                             
 66. 455 U.S. 489, 491 (1982) (quoting the ordinance at issue). 
 67. Id. at 496 (“The ordinance is expressly directed at commercial activity promoting or 
encouraging illegal drug use. If that activity is deemed ‘speech,’ then it is speech proposing 
an illegal transaction, which a government may regulate or ban entirely.”) (citing Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980); 
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973)). 
 68. Id. at 497.  
 69. Id. at 502.  
 70. Id. at 504–05.  
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peace officer to do so, if the surrounding circumstances are such 
as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands 
such identification.
71
 
Justice White recited the Flipside formula and argued that the statute had at 
least one clear application, i.e., when an officer asks a suspect for 
identification during a Terry stop and the suspect refuses to answer, it is 
likely “the suspect would know from the statute that a refusal to provide 
any information at all would constitute a violation.”
72
 
Despite rooting his analysis in Flipside, Justice White’s opinion was in 
dissent.
73
 The majority, per Justice O’Connor, concluded that the statute 
was “unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourage[d] arbitrary 
enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a 
suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute.”
74
 Responding to Justice 
White’s invocation of Flipside, the majority argued that a criminal statute 
deserves less judicial deference than a civil law regulation of commercial 
businesses because criminal laws visit the unfairly surprised with 
punishment and authorize arbitrary enforcement by police.
75
 The majority, 
however, did not disavow the similarity between the VFVD and the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine. On the contrary, the majority stated that 
“we [the Supreme Court] have traditionally viewed vagueness and 
overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines.”
76
 
The next major clash between minimal and sweeping versions of the 
VFVD occurred in City of Chicago v. Morales.
77
 Defendants convicted 
under Chicago’s Anti-Gang Loitering Ordinance challenged the ordinance 
as void for vagueness.
78
 The ordinance was complex. It directed police 
officers who observed two or more persons, one of whom the officer 
                                                                                                             
 71. 461 U.S. 352, 353 & n.1 (1983).  
 72. Id. at 371–72 (White, J., dissenting).  
 73. Id. at 369 (White, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 361.  
 75. Id. at 358 n.8 (“[W]here a statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of 
certainty is higher. This concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal statute on its 
face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application.”) (internal citation 
omitted); id. (“No authority cited by the dissent supports its argument about facial challenges 
in the arbitrary enforcement context.”).  
 76. Id.  
 77. 527 U.S. 41 (1999). By way of full disclosure, in this case the author filed a brief on 
behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys as amicus curiae, on 
behalf of respondents.  
 78. Id. at 45–46.  
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“reasonably believe[d] to be a criminal street gang member,” to order the 
group to disperse.
79
 The ordinance made failure to comply with an order to 
disperse a crime.
80
 It defined “loitering” as to “remain in any one place with 
no apparent purpose.”
81
 
The Illinois Supreme Court struck the ordinance down in a unanimous 
opinion that did not address the facial/as-applied distinction.
82
 The state 
court held that the ordinance violated the VFVD because of the ambiguity 
of the definitions in the ordinance, specifically that of loitering.
83
 The court 
also held the ordinance to be “an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties” 
and so a violation of substantive due process.
84
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice 
Souter and Justice Ginsburg, delivered a plurality opinion that followed the 
sweeping approach of Papachristou and Lawson.
85
 Without identifying any 
individual party before the Court as to whom the application of the 
ordinance had been vague, Justice Stevens concluded “that the vagueness of 
this enactment makes a facial challenge appropriate.”
86
 Justice Stevens 
distinguished the ordinance in Flipside as a law that “simply regulates 
business behavior and contains a scienter requirement,”
87
 in contrast to the 
Chicago ordinance that “is a criminal law that contains no mens rea 
requirement” and “infringes on constitutionally protected rights. When 
vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to facial attack.”
88
 
Justice Scalia’s dissent
89
 defended the minimal view of the VFVD. In his 
view, “a facial attack, since it requires unconstitutionality in all 
circumstances, necessarily presumes that the litigant presently before the 
court would be able to sustain an as-applied challenge.”
90
 Kolender v. 
Lawson, said Justice Scalia, “seems to have confused the standard for First 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. at 47 n.2 (quoting the ordinance at issue).  
 80. Id. at 48 (quoting the ordinance at issue). 
 81. Id. 47 n.2 (quoting the ordinance at issue). 
 82. Id. at 50–51. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 50 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59 (1997)). 
 85. Justice Stevens provided the Court’s opinion. Id. at 44. Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Parts I, II, and V. Id. Justices Souter and 
Ginsberg joined Parts III and VI. Id. 
 86. Id. at 55.  
 87. Id. (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)).  
 88. Id. (internal citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 89. Id. at 73–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 78 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Flipside, 455 U.S. at 495).  
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Amendment overbreadth challenges with the standard governing facial 
challenges on all other grounds.”
91
 
Justice O’Connor, author of Lawson, concurred separately
92
 but did not 
join the discussion of facial challenges in Part III of the Morales plurality 
opinion.
93
 Justice Kennedy also concurred,
94
 without joining Part III or 
otherwise sharing a view on the facial challenge issue.
95
 Justice Breyer 
joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion,
96
 but also wrote separately to address 
the facial challenge issue.
97
 As framed by Justice Breyer, the constitutional 
right at stake was the right to be free from arrest in the arbitrary discretion 
of the police.
98
 So viewed, “[t]he ordinance is unconstitutional, not because 
a policeman applied this discretion wisely or poorly in a particular case, but 
rather because the policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case.”
99
 
But if that is true, it would seem to follow that every law that fails the 
arbitrary-enforcement prong of the VFVD is liable to facial challenge. 
The various opinions in Morales failed to resolve the tension between 
the minimal view applied in Flipside and the sweeping view applied in 
Papachristou and Lawson. Justice Scalia, together with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion.
100
 Justice Thomas 
challenged the plurality’s vagueness analysis without speaking to the facial 
challenge issue.
101
 Thomas and Rehnquist did not join Justice Scalia’s 
opinion that placed primary emphasis on the facial challenge doctrine.
102
 
Even the three votes for a broad application of the VFVD were qualified 
by a procedural nicety. The Illinois Supreme Court had held the ordinance 
void on its face.
103
 Even if it were inappropriate for a federal court to test 
the statute facially in the first place, things might be different when the state 
court reached the issue first: 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. at 79 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 92. Id. at 64–69 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 93. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
 94. Morales, 527 U.S. at 69–70 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  
 95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
 96. Morales, 527 U.S. at 44.  
 97. Id. at 70–73 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 98. Id. at 71 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 99. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 100. Id. at 98–115 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 44.  
 101. See id. at 106–15 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 44.  
 103. Id. at 52.  
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When asserting a facial challenge, a party seeks to vindicate not 
only his own rights, but those of others who may also be 
adversely impacted by the statute in question. In this sense, the 
threshold for facial challenges is a species of third party (jus 
tertii) standing, which we have recognized as a prudential 
doctrine and not one mandated by Article III of the Constitution. 
When a state court has reached the merits of a constitutional 
claim, “invoking prudential limitations on [the respondent’s] 
assertion of jus tertii would serve no functional purpose.”
104
 
In Morales, then, dicta in a plurality opinion took the wide view of 
Papachristou and Lawson; Justice Breyer took the wide view provided the 
law failed the second prong of the test for vagueness; Justice Scalia 
objected to any facial challenge to any law that had at least one 
constitutional application; and four other justices declined the opportunity 
to join any of these opinions. 
A solid majority of the justices took the broader view in Skilling v. 
United States.
105
 Defendant Skilling challenged his conviction for 
conspiracy to violate the “honest services” statute.
106
 Skilling argued that 
the “honest services” statute was void for vagueness.
107
 Justice Ginsburg’s 
majority opinion held that the statute, construed to apply only to bribes and 
kickbacks, was not void for vagueness.
108
 The majority clearly premised 
this interpretation of the statute on the Court’s duty to save acts of Congress 
from invalidation.
109
 In other words, Skilling limited the statute to bribes 
and kickbacks because any broader reading of the statute would have made 
it void for vagueness, even in cases of bribes and kickbacks. 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. at 55–56 n.22 (internal citation omitted) (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. 
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243 (1983)) (citing Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 
Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984)). For discussion of the distinctive problem of facial 
challenges to state, as opposed to federal, laws, see Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to 
State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 283–87 (1994). 
 105. 561 U.S. 358 (2010).  
 106. Id. at 367; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the 
term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the 
intangible right of honest services.”). 
 107. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 376–77, 399. 
 108. Id. at 411 (“Holding that honest-services fraud does not encompass conduct more 
wide ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and kickbacks, we resist the 
Government’s less constrained construction absent Congress’ clear instruction otherwise.”). 
 109. See id. at 402–04. 
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Justice Scalia maintained the position he had taken in Morales. Here, 
however, he found that the statute was so vague as to have no clear 
applications whatsoever.
110
 Nevertheless, he remained skeptical about facial 
invalidation as a remedy.
111
 Given that Skilling had not sought facial 
invalidation, but only reversal of his own conviction, Justice Scalia would 
have left future defendants to raise as-applied challenges.
112
 The Skilling 
case itself would be a precedent, but not a ruling voiding the statute. Given 
Justice Scalia’s conclusion that the statute had no application that was not 
unconstitutionally vague, those as-applied challenges would all succeed. If 
Justice Scalia’s opinion had been for the majority, prosecutors would likely 
have given up on honest-services prosecutions, which seems to be 
functionally equivalent to facial invalidation. 
Only Justices Thomas and Kennedy joined Scalia’s opinion in Skilling.
113
 
Justice Kennedy did not join Part III of Scalia’s dissent—the portion of the 
opinion disclaiming facial invalidation as a remedy.
114
 Despite its ultimate 
holding, the Skilling majority’s embrace of the broad view of the VFVD 
might be characterized as dicta. The Court held that the statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague, albeit based on a construction of the statute 
predicated on the broad version of the VFVD.
115
 
Five years later, however, in Johnson v. United States,
116
 the Court held a 
statute—the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA)
117
—facially invalid under the VFVD.
118
 Samuel James Johnson, a 
white supremacist suspected by the government of plotting terrorism, 
pleaded guilty to a federal charge of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm.
119
 Standing alone, the firearms charge carried a maximum sentence 
of ten years.
120
 The government, however, asked the district court to 
sentence Johnson under the ACCA, a statute providing a mandatory 
                                                                                                             
 110. Id. at 424 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that 
Scalia believes that § 1346 has “no ‘ascertainable standard’ for the conduct it condemns”) 
(quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921)). 
 111. Id. at 424–25 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 112. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 113. Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 114. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 115. See id. at 411–13. 
 116. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 117. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2018), cited in Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2564. 
 118. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560–62.  
 119. Id. at 2556.  
 120. Id. at 2555.  
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minimum term of fifteen years and a maximum of life when, inter alia, the 
defendant has a record including three or more violent felonies.
121
 
In addition to forcible crimes, such as attempted murder or robbery, the 
act enumerates some specific serious crimes, such as burglary, as violent 
felonies.
122
 At the end of this list Congress added a residual clause 
including any crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.”
123
 Johnson’s record included 
three violent felonies if his state conviction for possessing a sawed-off 
shotgun qualified under the residual clause.
124
 Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion, joined by five other justices,
125
 overruled precedent by holding the 
residual clause void for vagueness.
126
 
The Court noted that the doctrine condemns “a criminal law so vague 
that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or 
so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”
127
 The vagueness 
doctrine “appl[ies] not only to statutes defining elements of crimes, but also 
to statutes fixing sentences.”
128
 Given the attenuated interest prospective 
criminals have in calculating the precise downside of their planned 
offenses,
129
 the discretion prong seems to be doing more work than the fair 
notice prong. Yet here, unlike Papachristou, Lawson, and Morales, the 
discretionary decisions were those of prosecutors rather than police on 
patrol. 
Despite the contextual differences between prosecutorial charging 
decisions influencing sentences (rather than arrest or conviction) and police 
patrol decisions, the Johnson Court applied the Papachristou-Lawson 
                                                                                                             
 121. Id. at 2556; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(5)(A)-(B). 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).  
 123. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 124. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.  
 125. Id. at 2555.  
 126. Id. at 2563.  
 127. Id. at 2556 (emphasis added) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 
(1983)).  
 128. Id. at 2557 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).  
 129. See id. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The fair notice concerns that inform our 
vagueness doctrine are aimed at ensuring that a ‘person of ordinary intelligence [has] a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.’ The fear 
is that vague laws will ‘trap the innocent.’ These concerns have less force when it comes to 
sentencing provisions, which come into play only after the defendant has been found guilty 
of the crime in question.”) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates 
v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)).  
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model.
130
 In a remarkable volte-face from his caustic dissent in Morales, 
Justice Scalia wrote the following: 
In all events, although statements in some of our opinions could 
be read to suggest otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict 
the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely 
because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the 
provision’s grasp. For instance, we have deemed a law 
prohibiting grocers from charging an “unjust or unreasonable 
rate” void for vagueness—even though charging someone a 
thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would surely be unjust and 
unreasonable. We have similarly deemed void for vagueness a 
law prohibiting people on sidewalks from “conduct[ing] 
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by”—even 
though spitting in someone’s face would surely be annoying. 
These decisions refute any suggestion that the existence of some 
obviously risky crimes establishes the residual clause’s 
constitutionality.
131
 
The majority quite clearly imported the overbreadth doctrine’s remedial 
component—facial invalidation—just as it had in Papachristou and 
Lawson. 
The majority also seemed to apply the overbreadth doctrine’s standing 
component. Not only did Johnson invalidate the residual clause on its face, 
it did so without first determining whether the clause was vague as applied 
to Johnson’s prior conviction for possessing a sawed-off shotgun.
132
  
                                                                                                             
 130. See id. at 2560–61.  
 131. Id. at 2560–61 (internal citations omitted) (citing United States v. L. Cohen Grocery 
Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)).  
 132. Id. at 2563. Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s analysis, but concurred because 
he found the residual clause did not apply to the sawed-off shotgun conviction. See id. at 
2563 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[R]ather than use the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause to nullify an Act of Congress, I would resolve this case on more 
ordinary grounds. Under conventional principles of interpretation and our precedents, the 
offense of unlawfully possessing a short-barreled shotgun does not constitute a ‘violent 
felony’ under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).”). Justice 
Alito rejected the majority’s vagueness analysis but concluded that Johnson’s prior offense 
was, as a statutory matter, a “crime of violence” and therefore dissented. Id. at 2582 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (“Because I would not strike down ACCA’s residual clause, it is necessary for 
me to address whether Johnson’s conviction for possessing a sawed-off shotgun qualifies as 
a violent felony. Under either the categorical approach or a conduct-specific inquiry, it 
does.”).  
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In Morales, Justice Scalia’s dissent took the premise to be that the 
remedy of facial invalidation was only available when the statute had no 
clear applications, and the conclusion followed that the individual 
defendant must be one to whom the law did not clearly apply.
133
 His 
majority opinion in Johnson simply reversed the syllogism. “It seems to us 
that the dissent’s [Justice Alito’s] supposed requirement of vagueness in all 
applications is not a requirement at all, but a tautology: If we hold a statute 
to be vague, it is vague in all its applications (and never mind the 
reality).”
134
 This certainly seems to adopt the broad view of the VFVD, 
especially since—unlike Morales, where the Supreme Court reviewed a 
state court’s decision to strike the statute on its face—Johnson was a federal 
prosecution.  
Only two justices adhered to the view that the VFVD condemns only 
laws that have no cases of clear application. Justice Thomas, concurring, 
repeated the position he took in his Morales dissent.
135
 Justice Alito, 
dissenting, chastised the majority for “hold[ing] that vagueness bars the use 
of the residual clause in other cases in which its applicability can hardly be 
questioned.”
136
 Justice Thomas and Justice Alito did not agree with the 
majority’s approach to facial challenges under the VFVD, but they 
accurately described it. 
Sessions v. Dimaya
137
 relied on Johnson to invalidate similar “crime of 
violence” language in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
138
 
Dimaya had been twice convicted of burglary.
139
 Justice Thomas in dissent 
argued that, because the residual clause in the INA was not vague as to 
burglary, Dimaya could not bring a facial challenge under the VFVD.
140
 
                                                                                                             
 133. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 134. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561.  
 135. Id. at 2573 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]f there is an unmistakable 
core that a reasonable person would know is forbidden by the law, the enactment is not 
unconstitutional on its face.”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 112 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).  
 136. Id. at 2581 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 137. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).  
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2018). 
 139. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1211. 
 140. Id. at 1250 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If the vagueness doctrine has any basis in the 
original meaning of the Due Process Clause, it must be limited to case-by-case challenges to 
particular applications of a statute. . . . This Court’s precedents likewise recognize that, 
outside the First Amendment context, a challenger must prove that the statute is vague as 
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Thomas highlighted that while Johnson preliminarily rejected “that a facial 
challenge requires a statute to be vague ‘in all applications,’” the case did 
not determine if a statute must definitely “be vague as applied to the person 
challenging it.”
141
 Instead his dissent noted that the Court did not need to 
address that point “because the Court concluded that ACCA’s residual 
clause was vague as applied to the crime at issue there: unlawful possession 
of a short-barreled shotgun.”
142
 
The majority in Dimaya rebuffed this attempt to resuscitate Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Morales. It is by no means clear, according to the 
Dimaya majority, that burglary is a crime of violence.
143
 “[S]till more 
fundamentally, Johnson made clear that our decisions ‘squarely contradict 
the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is 
some conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.’”
144
 
The VFVD is here to stay. In Johnson, Justice Thomas filed a separate 
opinion condemning the doctrine as a roving commission for activist judges 
to overrule elected legislatures on questions of policy.
145
 The rest of the 
justices in Johnson largely ignored this radical but formidable critique. In 
Dimaya, Justice Gorsuch, a newly appointed justice with an originalist 
orientation similar to Justice Thomas’s, took issue with Justice Thomas’s 
stance. Gorsuch defended the VFVD as a necessary implication of due 
process, with deep roots in early practice as well as the Constitution’s text 
and structure.
146
 
                                                                                                             
applied to him.”). Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito joined this portion of Justice Thomas’s 
dissent. Id. at 1234 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 141. Id. at 1250 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2551, 2561 (2015)). 
 142. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560). 
 143. See id. at 1214–15 n.3. This discussion is in Part III of Justice Kagan’s opinion, a 
Part joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Gorsuch. Id. at 1210. 
 144. Id. (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561).  
 145. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2570 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Since 
that time, the Court’s application of its vagueness doctrine has largely mirrored its 
application of substantive due process.”). 
 146. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1223–28 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Davis, 139 S. 
Ct. 2319 (2019). Davis dealt with a VFVD challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(b), which 
provided a mandatory minimum sentence for defendants who use, carry, or possess a firearm 
in connection with a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.” The majority relied on Johnson to hold § 924(c)(3)(b) void for vagueness. The 
dissent argued, inter alia, that the constitutional avoidance canon called for construing the 
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So, for the foreseeable future, the Court will continue to scrutinize 
statutes under the two prongs of the VFVD. Johnson and Dimaya 
reaffirmed the VFVD despite Justice Thomas’s foundational challenge. 
These decisions not only preserved but also “revitalized” the doctrine,
147
 by 
settling the confusion in Morales in favor of the right of defendants (civil or 
criminal) to bring facial challenges against laws that have some clear 
applications. 
IV. Vagueness Challenges to Consent-Based Sexual Assault Statutes 
A. The Brewing Storm 
The Colorado courts have consistently rejected vagueness challenges to a 
section of the state’s sexual assault statute that makes it a crime to commit 
sex acts on a victim when defendant “actor causes submission of the victim 
by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause 
submission against the victim’s will[.]”
148
 The Colorado Supreme Court 
rejected a VFVD challenge to this statute as early as the 1981 decision in 
Colorado v. Smith.
149
 
Smith predated Lawrence and Johnson by decades. Smith applied the 
narrow, as-applied version of the VFVD.
150
 “Moreover,” said the Smith 
court, “[it is not] unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously 
close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross 
                                                                                                             
statute to save it. See Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2349–53 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The 
avoidance-canon argument would have gone far toward reinstating the classical view—the 
view rejected by both Johnson and Dimaya. See id. at 2333 (majority opinion) (“Respect for 
due process and the separation of powers suggests a court may not, in order to save Congress 
the trouble of having to write a new law, construe a criminal statute to penalize conduct it 
does not clearly proscribe.”). Notably, Chief Justice Roberts joined the dissent but refused to 
endorse this part of the dissenting opinion. That position is consistent with the Chief 
Justice’s vote for the majority in Johnson. This suggests that only Justices Kavanaugh, Alito, 
and Thomas continue to support the classical approach. 
 147. Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2019) (W. Fletcher, J., 
concurring).  
 148. The current version of this provision is COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(a) (2019).  
 149. 638 P.2d 1, 7 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).  
 150. See id. at 5–6 (“The defendants cite several hypothetical examples to demonstrate 
their claim that the scope of the statute is unclear. However, they do not contend that any of 
the defendants here is charged on the basis of such conduct. ‘Disputes concerning the 
application of a criminal statute to marginal cases can be more meaningfully resolved 
according to the rules of strict construction of the statutory terms within the context of the 
specific facts of the case.’”) (quoting Colorado v. Garcia, 541 P.2d 687, 689 (Colo. 1975)).  
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the line.”
151
 Since Smith, Johnson rejected the strict-construction, as-applied 
approach to the VFVD, and Lawrence gave fresh constitutional protection 
to with-consent conduct.
152
 
The Colorado statute, moreover, includes an implicit mens rea 
requirement.
153
 The defendant’s “means” must not only cause the victim to 
submit against the victim’s will, but the means must also be “reasonably 
calculated” to cause submission against the will.
154
 A defendant cannot be 
guilty unless a reasonable person would know that the means used were 
likely to be coercive. The Smith court took this language to require not just 
negligence but subjective awareness that coercion was likely.
155
 This at 
least reduces fair notice concerns. Not all sex-without-consent statutes, 
however, require mens rea beyond the general intent to perform the sex act. 
B. Vagueness Challenges to Sex-Without-Consent Statutes After Lawrence 
and Johnson 
Recent statutes deleting all traces of the force element found in 
traditional rape statutes have taken various forms.
156
 Some criminalize sex 
without consent, without including a statutory definition of consent.
157
 The 
statutes that undertake to define consent say either that expressed refusal is 
(at least one species of) nonconsent,
158
 while others say nonconsent is the 
absence of affirmative permission.
159
 Finally, some statutes criminalize sex 
                                                                                                             
 151. Id. at 6 (quoting Colorado v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 388 (Colo. 1975) (en banc)).  
 152. Smith also relied on the long-standing role of consent in the law of rape to fend off 
the vagueness challenge. See id. at 4 n.5 (“Finally, the statute must be read with reference to 
the traditional crimes which are its forerunners. Common law rape and its statutory 
counterparts have historically made the lack of consent to sexual penetration essential to the 
offense.”). To say that a statute making consent exculpatory is a statute condemning forced 
sex, however, is not the same as saying that a statute condemning sex without consent is 
constitutional.  
 153. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(a) (2019).  
 154. Id. 
 155. See Smith, 638 P.2d at 5 n.7 (“[T]he phrase ‘of sufficient consequence reasonably 
calculated’ clearly implies that the actor must be aware that his or her conduct is sufficient in 
character and degree to be likely to cause nonconsensual submission.”).  
 156. For a survey of state consent statutes, see Consent Laws, RAINN, 
https://apps.rainn.org/policy/compare/consent-laws.cfm (last updated Mar. 2020). 
 157. See, e.g., 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (West 2019). 
 158. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-318(8)(b) (West 2019) (“The victim need only 
resist, either verbally or physically, so as to make the victim's refusal to consent genuine and 
real and so as to reasonably make known to the actor the victim's refusal to consent[.]”).  
 159. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2018) (punishing “sexual contact with another 
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in particular contexts where the risk of coercion is so great that consent is 
not allowed as a defense.
160
  
This Part considers how a vagueness challenge to a no-consent-
sufficient, consent-undefined statute might play out. The Pennsylvania 
statute, treated as a lesser-included offense of forcible-compulsion rape in 
the well-known Berkowitz case, is a prominent example. As modified by 
the legislature after Berkowitz to increase the severity of the penalty, the 
statute now reads as follows: 
Except as provided in section 3121 (relating to rape) or 3123 
(relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse), a person 
commits a felony of the second degree when that person engages 
in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a 
complainant without the complainant's consent.
161
 
The Pennsylvania penal code includes a section defining terms for sexual 
offenses but does not include a definition of “consent.”
162
 Pennsylvania 
defines attempts according to the MPC’s “substantial step” test.
163
 
Now, suppose a defendant, charged under this statute, moves to dismiss 
the charge before trial because the statute is, on its face, void for vagueness. 
Johnson and Dimaya now allow a defendant, even if guilty as charged, to 
challenge the law under the VFVD.
164
 Even if anything is left of the 
Flipside formula, all the factors used by Justice Stevens in Morales to 
distinguish Flipside are present here.
165
 
Specifically, under Flipside, the defendant faces a felony charge, not an 
administrative proceeding for violating a business regulation. The statute 
does not include a mens rea requirement beyond the general intent to 
commit the sex act.
166
 The Pennsylvania code does allow a reasonable-
mistake-of-age defense when the victim was, in fact, over fourteen years 
old.
167
 There is no similar provision respecting mistakes about consent, and 
                                                                                                             
person without that other person’s permission”).  
 160. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.145 (West 2019) (stating that consent is not a 
defense when a person has sex with a prisoner or offender).  
 161. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1. 
 162. See id. § 3101. There is no definition of consent in the code’s introductory 
definitions sections either. See id. § 103.  
 163. See id. § 901.  
 164. See supra Part III.  
 165. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 166. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1.  
 167. Id. § 3102.  
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the Pennsylvania courts have refused to instruct on mistake in sexual 
assault cases under the code’s general mistake provision.
168
 After 
Lawrence, the statute impinges on constitutionally protected activity, 
although just how strongly protected this activity is remains an open 
question. If Justice Stevens was right that the broad version of the VFVD 
applies when the statute impinges on the right to use the sidewalks, then 
surely it follows from Lawrence that the broad version applies to a statute 
with potential application to consensual sex indoors. 
To succeed on the merits, a defendant needs to establish at least one of 
the VFVD’s two prongs: lack of notice or invitation to arbitrary 
enforcement.
169
 We will begin with the fair warning requirement. Consent 
is notoriously hard to define.
170
 Some other jurisdictions, and a 
cacophonous academic literature, have attempted clarification without 
coming close to consensus.
171
 The Pennsylvania statute eschews even the 
attempt, leaving citizens to do their best with their preanalytic intuitions 
about the term.
172
 
Whether consent has been given—either expressly or impliedly by 
conduct—typically presents more factual than legal uncertainty. Major 
areas of legal uncertainty include what the scope of consent, if given, may 
be, and what inducements other than force or threat of force make assent or 
acquiescence different from consent as used in the statute. The literature 
abounds with examples, many of them anything but purely hypothetical.
173
 
                                                                                                             
 168. Section 304(1) provides that ignorance or mistake “for which there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse, is a defense if: (1) the ignorance or mistake negatives the intent, 
knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the 
offense[.]” Id. § 304(1). The commonwealth’s courts have held that this provision does not 
require a reasonable-mistake defense in sexual assault cases. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. 
Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 99–100 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). For the most recent resume of the 
decisions, see the non-precedential decision in Pennsylvania v. Hairston, No. 1108 WDA 
2013, 2015 WL 6550727, at *19 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015) (“[P]ursuant to the above 
precedent, a ‘mistake of fact’ jury instruction is not appropriate in sexual assault cases.”). 
 169. See supra Part III.  
 170. See, e.g., Richard H.S. Tur, Two Theories of Criminal Law, 56 SMU L. REV. 797, 
807 (2003) (“[C]onsent is a context-dependent notion that may be difficult to define 
exhaustively.”). Others have expressed the same quizzicality in stronger language. See, e.g., 
Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 421 (2016) (“Consent is a 
philosophical, psychological, and legal quagmire, the escape from which I do not attempt 
here.”). 
 171. See infra Section V.A. 
 172. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 173. See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 144–62 (2003) 
 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
148 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:121 
 
 
Scope of consent has a temporal as well as a behavioral dimension. If 
victim rebuffs defendant, defendant returns and tries again, and victim 
relents after repeated iterations, is this consent? If defendant moves from 
one stage of foreplay, or one type of penetration, to another, does defendant 
act at peril of misinterpreting victim’s (a) state of mind, (b) words, and/or 
(c) actions? 
Fraud ordinarily taints consent,
174
 and this seems easy enough when 
defendant knowingly misrepresents defendant’s sexual health status. What, 
however, if victim asks about STDs, and defendant honestly, but 
incorrectly, reports that defendant is negative for HIV, HPV, or chlamydia? 
Or what about when defendant and victim meet online, with defendant 
falsely claiming to be unmarried and victim falsely claiming to be twenty-
nine years old? The crime of attempted sexual assault portends further 
problems. Even if defendant and victim never meet, their representations 
may qualify as attempts under the expansive view of the MPC.
175
 
Improper inducements other than force are another problem. Suppose 
defendant is victim’s supervisor at work, victim deserves a good annual 
review, and defendant represents that unless victim has sex with defendant, 
defendant will turn in a negative review. Perhaps, instead, victim deserves a 
negative review, and defendant represents that they will turn in a positive 
one provided victim has sex with defendant. Note that even if victim 
immediately reports these suggestions to either higher management or law 
enforcement, defendant is potentially guilty of an attempt to violate section 
3124.1.
176
 
A large body of literature addresses whether cases like these are cases of 
consent or of no consent.
177
 It seems dubious indeed that the VFVD’s 
person of ordinary intelligence would know the meaning of section 3124.1 
in these (quite common) situations. If that hypothetical person can only 
guess how the courts might come out, then the statute fails the fair notice 
prong. 
                                                                                                             
(presenting multiple problematic hypotheticals, many based on reported cases).  
 174. See Legal Role of Consent, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/legal-role-
consent (last visited May 26, 2020). 
 175. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2020) (providing that jury 
may find that enticing victim to meet defendant was a “substantial step” corroborating 
defendant’s criminal purpose). 
 176. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124.1 (West 2019).  
 177. See generally THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Franklin G. Miller 
& Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010); WERTHEIMER, supra note 173; PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC 
OF CONSENT (2004).  
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The arbitrary enforcement prong applies, paradigmatically, to police on 
proactive patrol as in Papachristou, Lawson and Morales.
178
 Johnson 
makes clear that the discretion prong is not limited to police on patrol, but 
extends to prosecutors making charging decisions.
179
 It also applies, the 
Court has said, to the risk that judges will be arbitrary in permitting some 
cases to go forward but not others, and that juries may be arbitrary in 
convicting and acquitting defendants who engaged in morally 
indistinguishable conduct.
180
 
In the real world, criminal justice actors are far more likely to reject 
meritorious rape prosecutions than to press the envelope of statutory 
liability. The VFVD, however, condemns the existence of arbitrary 
discretion, in whatever way that discretion may be exercised (or come to be 
exercised). That is just what it means to void a statute on its face. 
Lawrence adds another reason to follow Johnson in the context of 
consent-to-sex cases. If courts revert to the McBoyle-Flipside as-applied 
approach, they would have to decide whether the statute’s definition of 
consent was at least as broad as the constitutional test under Lawrence. The 
canon of constitutional avoidance would have special force for any court 
asked to give a clear constitutional definition of consent. 
Of course, the Supreme Court might backtrack on Johnson or on 
Lawrence or both. Legislatures might give up on defining crimes solely in 
terms of sex without consent. The storm, as I said, might blow over. But it 
behooves us to think about how to weather the storm if all three 
developments remain as forecasted. 
V. Observing Legality in Consent-Based Regimes 
A. Defining “Consent,” Specific Filters, and Mens Rea: Lessons from 
California 
The most obvious response to vagueness concerns with consent-based 
statutes is to define consent. The academic literature identifies two principal 
definitions, one attitudinal and the other performative.
181
 Attitudinal 
                                                                                                             
 178. See supra Part III.  
 179. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 180. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (“[T]he doctrine guards 
against arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement by insisting that a statute provide 
standards to govern the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges.”). 
 181. See, e.g., WESTEN, supra note 177, at 139.  
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accounts understand consent as a mental state of volitional acquiescence.
182
 
Performative accounts understand consent as some sign or token of 
attitudinal consent.
183
 On an attitudinal account, words and acts are 
evidence of consent, but not consent. Performative accounts, on the other 
hand, are over-inclusive and under-inclusive of attitudinal consent, but they 
may capture common intuitions of wrongful imposition better than a pure 
attitudinal account.
184
 Both approaches have distinguished defenders.
185
 
The law takes consent into account because consent is normatively 
transformative. It converts that which would otherwise be a wrong into 
something that is not wrong (or not as wrong). Whether understood 
attitudinally or performatively, consent matters normatively only when it is 
not wrongfully induced. The robbery victim consents to surrendering 
money because the victim quite sincerely prefers her life to her money, and 
she communicates this consent by handing over her wallet. But both her 
attitude and her token of it are coerced by the gunman. So not only does the 
law need to define what consent is, the law also needs to define the 
inducements that nullify the normative force of consent when given. 
How should lawmakers approach the task of capturing, in reasonably 
clear legal language, the emerging consensus characterizing absence of 
consent as the gravamen of rape? California’s approach illustrates both the 
basic challenge and some possible responses. The legislature attempted to 
define consent but backstopped a problematic definition by exclusions from 
the definition, retaining the force requirement, and provided a limited 
mistake-of-fact defense. 
Penal Code section 261.6 defines consent as “positive cooperation in act 
or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely 
and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction 
involved.”
186
 The same section further provides that “[a] current or previous 
dating or marital relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute 
                                                                                                             
 182. Id. at 6. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Whether a performative definition of consent performs this function better than a 
robust mens rea requirement re the absence of attitudinal consent is a fair question. See id. at 
160.  
 185. For defenses of attitudinal theories, see Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of 
Consent (II), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165 (1996); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, Culpability, 
and the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2016); Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic 
of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (1996). For defenses of performative theories, see JOEL 
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 173–76 (1986); WERTHEIMER, supra note 173, at 146–47.  
 186. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2019). 
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consent.”
187
 Another section of the statute provides that the victim’s request 
that the perpetrator use a condom “without additional evidence of consent, 
is not sufficient to constitute consent.”
188
 
The definition initially adopts, in the disjunctive, attitudinal and 
performative accounts (the “act or attitude” language), but then subsumes 
the performative into the attitudinal by making “an exercise of free will” a 
requirement of “consent.” Normative concerns are acknowledged, but not 
clarified, by the “freely and voluntarily” language. The standard jury 
instructions repeat, but make no attempt to explain, the statutory 
language.
189
 
This valiant attempt fails utterly. Consent is “positive cooperation” but 
passivity might be “positive cooperation” in attitude. Positive cooperation 
even by act must be chosen by “free will” understood as “acting freely and 
voluntarily.” The abstract definition adds nothing to, and subtracts nothing 
from, a jury’s preanalytic notions of “consent.” Were this language, 
standing alone, to define liability for a serious crime, it would be a 
conspicuous invitation to challenge under the VFVD.  
The language, however, does not stand alone. First, the statutes 
specifically exclude, as conclusive proof of consent, a prior relationship or 
a victim’s request that the defendant use a condom.
190
 By themselves, these 
rifle-shot exclusions don’t much clarify the scope of “consent,” but they 
illustrate the sort of items that might be put on a much longer list of 
exclusions. We will return to this possibility shortly. 
Second, and more consequentially, California retains an expanded 
version of the traditional force requirement. Rape includes sex 
“accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, 
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or 
another.”
191
 The offense, however, also includes sex with unconscious or 
otherwise helpless victims.
192
 Similarly equated with force is “threatening 
to use the authority of a public official to incarcerate, arrest, or deport the 
victim or another, and the victim has a reasonable belief that the perpetrator 
is a public official.”
193
 
                                                                                                             
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. § 261.7. 
 189. See 1 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 1000 (2020). 
 190. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261.6, 261.7. 
 191. Id. § 261(a)(2).  
 192. Id. § 261(a)(3), (4).  
 193. Id. § 261(a)(7).  
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Third, California exculpates defendants who reasonably, but mistakenly, 
believed the victim consented.
194
 Exculpation is limited. The instruction is 
only appropriate when substantial evidence points to “equivocal conduct” 
by the victim that precedes the defendant’s use of force or threats.
195
 Even 
when it applies, the defense has an objective component, i.e., the 
defendant’s mistake must be reasonable as well as sincere.
196
  
To be sure, when consent is clearly absent, the California courts will 
uphold convictions on proof of outrageous conduct that causes reasonable 
fear of force without an explicit threat.
197
 Nonetheless, California law 
defines the crime as forced sex and then filters those cases according to the 
presence or absence of (vaguely defined) consent. A vague escape hatch 
from a clear but sweepingly overbroad definition of the offense doesn’t 
address the fair-warning and anti-discretion concerns behind the VFVD. It 
would not change the result in Papachristou if the statute provided that “use 
of the public streets is a misdemeanor” and then provided a defense for 
“whoever has apparent lawful business.” 
The situation here, however, is different. The only innocent conduct at 
risk of prosecution is forcible but consensual sex—sadomasochism 
(“SM”)—that the vagueness of the consent definition leaves under-
protected. Even if the statutory definition of consent is under-protective of 
the constitutional rights at stake, the mistake defense protects against unfair 
surprise. Persons inclined to such behavior can (and often do) take care to 
memorialize the existence and scope of consent.
198
 
                                                                                                             
 194. See California v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1344–47 (Cal. 1975) (en banc).  
 195. California v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 965 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).  
 196. Id. (“[R]egardless of how strongly a defendant may subjectively believe a person 
has consented to sexual intercourse, that belief must be formed under circumstances society 
will tolerate as reasonable in order for the defendant to have adduced substantial evidence 
giving rise to a Mayberry instruction.”).  
 197. See California v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1188–89 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (“Sudden, 
unconsented-to groping, disrobing, and ensuing sexual intercourse while one appears to lie 
sleeping is an appalling and intolerable invasion of one’s personal autonomy that, in and of 
itself, would reasonably cause one to react with fear.”).  
 198. In their online glossary, the National Coalition for Sexual Freedom defines 
“contract” as “[a] written agreement between the dominant & submissive, agreed to after 
negotiation by the dominant and the sub, outlining the structure, guidelines, rules and 
boundaries of the relationship. It is not legally binding.” Glossary, NAT’L COALITION FOR 
SEXUAL FREEDOM, https://secureservercdn.net/198.71.233.68/9xj.1d5.myftpupload.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/BDSM-Glossary.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2020). Precise empirical 
data on how many such documents are uttered is unavailable.  
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If this statutory mix inhibited genuinely consensual activity, it is not 
consensual activity of the sort the Lawrence Court had in mind. Plenty of 
criminal conduct can be incorporated into consensual sex, parallel to the 
role that criminal conduct may play in religious ceremonies.
199
 There is, 
most obviously, no “we-only-used-it-for-sex defense” to drug charges. Like 
outlawing drug use even during sex, outlawing violence even during sex is 
very different than outlawing sex. 
From the standpoint of enforcement discretion, an overbroad prohibition 
on forcible sex covers very few cases. Precise statistics are, of course, 
unavailable, but SM behavior is not the norm. Law enforcement in these 
unusual cases is reactive rather than proactive. Police and prosecutors 
become aware of potential violations when victims come forward. To 
succeed in prosecuting invidiously selected rough-sex enthusiasts, 
prosecutors would need to persuade judges and juries to reject both 
meritorious consent claims and reasonable-mistake claims. So, even setting 
aside the historical pedigree of the forcible compulsion formula, limiting 
rape prosecutions to the no-consent cases where a defendant uses force 
easily passes the Johnson-Dimaya overbreadth test. 
California also criminalizes some unforced, nonconsensual sexual 
contact. The general sexual battery provision provides that whoever: 
touches an intimate part of another person, if the touching is 
against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific 
purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, 
is guilty of misdemeanor sexual battery, punishable by a fine not 
exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in 
                                                                                                             
 199. See, e.g., Craig Sloane, Slideshow: The Perfect Storm: Gay Men, Crystal Meth and 
Sex, https://www.naadac.org/assets/2416/craig_sloane_-_naadac_handouts.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 6, 2020) (“My experience is that the beginning part of shooting crystal into my veins is 
the phenomenal horniness that is just so delicious. It’s like nothing I’ve ever experienced.”) 
(quoting a recovering methamphetamine addict). In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court 
rejected a Free Exercise challenge to denial of unemployment benefits to individuals who 
lost their jobs for using peyote in bona fide religious observances. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
Because Oregon law at the time made possession of peyote a crime when committed for any 
purpose, the law did not abridge free exercise of religion. See id. So even if Lawrence gave 
the erotic side of life the same constitutional protection as life’s spiritual side, the 
constitutional right to sexual autonomy creates no defense to prosecutions for laws of 
general applicability banning possession of drugs, child pornography, or any other 
contraband.  
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a county jail not exceeding six months, or by both that fine and 
imprisonment.
200
 
The offense is subject to the same definition of consent, and the same 
reasonable mistake defense, as the forcible rape offense.
201
 
By contrast to the forcible rape statute, this statute does pose risks that 
the VFVD aims to minimize. The sexual battery law has many clear 
applications, e.g., when a defendant gropes a complete stranger on a 
crowded subway car. By contrast, even when two adults have engaged in 
consensual intercourse in the past, it can be legally quite uncertain whether 
on another occasion the first intimate touching is with or without consent. 
By statute, A’s intimate contact must follow B’s “positive cooperation in 
act or attitude.”
202
 If A’s guess is wrong, A has committed a crime that 
cannot be uncommitted by scrupulously desisting. If A’s guess is right, 
what follows is precisely the sort of private physical intimacy the Lawrence 
Court had in mind. Perhaps the reasonable mistake defense is enough to 
satisfy the VFVD’s fair-warning prong. The reported cases typically 
involve workplace harassment or convictions returned on the sexual battery 
charge as a lesser-included offense of forcible or statutory rape charges. 
The statute, however, is not confined to these circumstances. Social mores 
and official discretion may be doing the work the VFVD’s discretion prong 
commits to the legislature. 
California law teaches some generalizable lessons. First, attempts to 
define “consent” in purely attitudinal terms are unlikely to succeed. Second, 
statutes can specifically include and exclude some recurring types of cases 
from the scope of consent. Third, a mistake defense goes some distance 
toward ameliorating the tension between less-than-certain definitions of 
consent and the VFVD. Taking these lessons into consideration, future 
drafters can more clearly articulate future pure-consent statutes. 
  
                                                                                                             
 200. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1) (West 2019).  
 201. See California v. Andrews, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183, 194–95 (Ct. App. 2015).  
 202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6. In prosecutions for sexual battery, the instructions on 
consent track the language of California Penal Code § 261.6. See California v. Noppe, No. 
E036678, 2005 WL 2864351, at *6–7 (Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2005).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/7
2020]       THE BREWING STORM OVER UNDEFINED CONSENT 155 
 
 
B. Navigating the Storm: Principles for Maximum Clarity in Consent-Based 
Sexual Assault Law 
1. Performative Consent 
One response to concerns about the vagueness of consent is to define the 
term, for legal purposes, solely by the evidentiary tokens of consent. The 
two main approaches are categorized as “affirmative consent” statutes and 
“no-means-no” statutes. The federal sexual abuse statute, referenced earlier, 
is an example of an affirmative consent statute.
203
 The offense is defined as 
“knowingly engag[ing]” “in sexual contact with another person without that 
other person’s permission[.]”
204
 “Permission,” however, can be implied as 
well as expressed. 
Less inclusive, but also less vague, is a no-means-no formula, such as 
Nebraska’s. There, “without consent” means: 
 (a)(i) The victim was compelled to submit due to the use of 
force or threat of force or coercion, or (ii) the victim expressed a 
lack of consent through words, or (iii) the victim expressed a 
lack of consent through conduct, or (iv) the consent, if any was 
actually given, was the result of the actor’s deception as to the 
identity of the actor or the nature or purpose of the act on the 
part of the actor; 
 (b) The victim need only resist, either verbally or physically, 
so as to make the victim's refusal to consent genuine and real and 
so as to reasonably make known to the actor the victim's refusal 
to consent; and 
 (c) A victim need not resist verbally or physically where it 
would be useless or futile to do so[.]
205
 
The Nebraska statute goes so far down the road of fair warning as to 
retain a vestigial form of the resistance requirement. 
I say vestigial because in any case of non-consent expressed by words or 
“expressed by conduct” the victim will have “resist[ed], either verbally or 
physically.”
206
 Whatever the merits of that throwback, while the federal 
“without permission” language covers more conduct than the Nebraska 
                                                                                                             
 203. 18 U.S.C. § 2244 (2018). 
 204. Id. § 2244(b). 
 205. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8) (2019).  
 206. See id.  
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expressed-lack-of-consent language, nothing covered by Nebraska’s no-
means-no language would be legal under the affirmative permission 
language. 
If that is so, it makes sense to say it. Global definitions of consent may 
be vague, but the definitions can be made clear in particular cases by 
specific filters. The federal statute, for example, could be amended to 
provide that “permission is not present immediately following lack of 
consent expressed through words or conduct.” 
Performative definitions of consent will consider some sexual acts as 
crimes where attitudinal consent may nevertheless be present.
207
 It seems 
unlikely that such cases would provoke colorable reports to the authorities. 
The line between different versions of performative definitions is intensely 
controversial. Any jurisdiction that elects the affirmative consent approach 
would be well-advised to include a specific no-means-no term. The benefits 
of clarity outweigh any benefits of theoretical purity. 
The point is more general. The more specific filters the legislation 
includes, both in specific inclusions and specific exclusions, the more 
consonant it will be with the VFVD and the legal virtues behind it. 
Retaining a traditional forcible compulsion offense, as an aggravated 
version of the more general without-consent offense, is a no-brainer. Other 
filters, however, make good sense, even if their precise borders may excite 
political controversy. 
2. Filtering Wrongful Inducements 
Any full treatment of wrongful inducements that invalidate consent is 
beyond the scope of this Article. It can, however, illustrate the role of legal 
filters even by considering only one species of wrongful inducement, i.e., 
deception. Consent obtained by fraud seems to be obtained without consent, 
even in cases when both parties have deceived the other. Given how many 
people lie for the sake of sex,
208
 treating fraud as vitiating consent in those 
cases seems in dire tension with both prongs of the VFVD. Neither the 
                                                                                                             
 207. See, e.g., Ferzan, supra note 185, at 405 (“[A]ssume that a man is awakened by the 
woman he had intercourse with the night before performing oral sex on him. When he wakes 
up he thinks, ‘this is the best alarm clock ever.’ He proceeds to do nothing to indicate his 
acceptance of this act.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Monica Anderson et al., The Virtues and Downsides of Online Dating, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/02/06/the-virtues-
and-downsides-of-online-dating/ (“Roughly seven-in-ten online daters believe it is very 
common for those who use these platforms to lie to try to appear more desirable.”). 
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denizens of online dating sites nor public officials have any clear idea of 
where the line between white lies, puffery, and caveat emptor on one side, 
and criminally sinister deception on the other, should be drawn.
209
 
That line ought to be drawn by legislatures, and the VFVD just might 
force legislatures to draw it. Imagine an amendment to the federal statute 
providing that: “‘Permission’ does not include apparent permission 
obtained by knowingly false representations about the risk that sexual 
contact with the defendant may infect the defendant’s partners with any 
sexually-transmitted disease.” This might be subsection (a) of a long list, 
ending with (d), (g), (x), or (z). The list might also include affirmative 
disclosure obligations, not just negative prohibitions on types of affirmative 
misrepresentations. 
The corresponding negative filter is simpler. “‘Permission’ includes 
permission obtained by knowing or unknowing misrepresentations other 
than those herein specified.” Thus far, legislatures have shown reluctance to 
apply even tort sanctions to dating misrepresentations.
210
 Legislatures 
moving to criminalize sexual fraud should filter any general prohibition by 
singling out specific types of deception that call for criminal sanctions. 
Legislative dialogue on such filters may be uncomfortable. It is 
nonetheless necessary. Without it, unfiltered “consent” statutes potentially 
reach far more conduct than anyone expects to be prosecuted. That sets up a 
Johnson-Dimaya challenge to any unfiltered consent statute, on its face. A 
defendant who admits the victim said “no” could have the statute struck 
down, root and branch, precisely because the statute leaves the real work of 
lawmaking to be done by prosecutors and juries. 
3. Mens Rea 
Not all jurisdictions allow a defense even for reasonable mistakes. For 
example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the defense 
in Massachusetts v. Lopez.
211
 The Lopez court acknowledged that most 
states now provide a mistake defense, but joined the company of a 
                                                                                                             
 209. On the difficulty of line-drawing with respect to consent to sex induced by false 
statements, see STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 152–59 (1998); WERTHEIMER, 
supra note 185, at 193–214.  
 210. See Irina D. Manta, Tinder Lies, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207, 237 (2019) (“Most 
attempts in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century to target sexual fraud, whether in 
the criminal or tort arena, have found little acceptance in legislatures.”).  
 211. 745 N.E.2d 961, 969 (Mass. 2001).  
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significant minority.
212
 As Lopez recognized, a robust force requirement 
made reasonable mistakes about consent improbable, if not indeed actually 
impossible, reducing the necessity of finding such a defense.
213
  
Times have changed. The scope of liability has grown, and with it, the 
case for the criminal law’s principled insistence on subjective awareness of 
wrongdoing. It seems quite clear that scienter requirements help to fend off 
challenges under the VFVD.
214
 If legislatures decide, as many of them 
have, to make sex without consent a felony offense, they ought, in fairness, 
to make the absence of consent something other than a strict liability 
circumstance element. If they choose to drop the force requirement, adopt 
no other filters, and rely on the tradition of strict liability carried down from 
days when the force and resistance requirements made liability anything but 
strict, they are inviting a distinctly nontrivial challenge under the VFVD. 
Conclusion 
Quite aside from constitutional doctrine, criminal statutes ought to 
respect the legal virtues—fair warning, constraint of discretion, and neutral 
determinations of wrongfulness ex ante. There is much to be said for 
defining the central sex offense as the violation of autonomy. My thesis 
here has held that we can do this with less offense to the legal virtues than 
may widely be supposed. Indeed, if the Supreme Court takes the latest 
version of the void-for-vagueness doctrine seriously, this is not just the best 
way, but perhaps the only way, toward a legitimate and functional law of 
sexual assault premised on autonomy. 
                                                                                                             
 212. Id. at 968–69.  
 213. Id. at 966 (“Other jurisdictions have held that a mistake of fact instruction is 
necessary to prevent injustice. New Jersey, for instance, does not require the force necessary 
for rape to be anything more than what is needed to accomplish penetration. Thus, an 
instruction as to a defendant’s honest and reasonable belief as to consent is available in New 
Jersey to mitigate the undesirable and unforeseen consequences that may flow from this 
construction.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 214. See, e.g., Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 526 (1994) 
(“[T]he scienter requirement that we have inferred in [the instant statute] assists in avoiding 
any vagueness problem.”) (emphasis added).  
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